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Schizophrenia literally means “split mind.”1 Consequently, it should
not be too surprising that the United States Supreme Court, which is a
theoretically continuing body with nine ever-changing minds, would say
things in one year that seem schizophrenic when contrasted with last
year’s jurisprudence. Unfortunately, many of the inconsistent statements
remain good law, and the result largely depends on which doctrine the
Court chooses to trot out.
In this essay, four such statements and the extent that each should be
taken seriously will be examined:

* George Killam Professor of Criminal Law, Texas Tech University School of
Law; Graham Kenan Professor Emerius, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1. THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 897 (1999).
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(1) “Under our system society carries the burden of proving its
charge against the accused not out of his own mouth. It must
establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused even under
judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through
skillful interrogation. ‘The law will not suffer a prisoner to be
made the deluded instrument of his own conviction.’”2
(2) “We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that
a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend
on ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.”3
(3) “We have held that a valid waiver does not require that an
individual be informed of all information ‘useful’ in making his
decision or information that ‘might . . . affec[t] his decision to
confess. . . . [W]e have never read the Constitution to require
that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to
help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak
or stand by his rights.’ Here the additional information could
affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially
voluntary and knowing nature.”4
(4) “[T]he ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an
evil but an unmitigated good . . . . Admissions of guilt resulting
from valid Miranda waivers ‘are more than merely “desirable”;
they are essential to society’s compelling interest in finding,
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.’”5
I. WATTS V. INDIANA
A first reaction to the Watts v. Indiana language is that the Court did
not mean it when it said it, never meant it before it said it, and it
certainly does not mean it today. With incredible regularity, the law
“suffer[s] a prisoner to be made the deluded instrument of his own

2.

Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (quoting 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS
46, § 34, at 595 (8th ed. 1824)).
3. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488–89 (1964) (citations omitted).
4. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1987) (quoting Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986)).
5. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) (quoting Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986)).

OF THE CROWN ch.
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conviction.”6 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter, the author of the Watts plurality
opinion, joined some such opinions.7
The harder question is whether we should mean it. Consider the following:
(A) The police falsely tell Carl that his fingerprints were found in the
victim’s home so he may as well confess. Carl does confess.8 The confession
is admissible.9 (B) A policeman points a gun at unarmed Ben, whom he
has cornered in a supermarket. Believing that Ben has hidden a gun
nearby, he asks, without giving Miranda warnings: “Where’s the gun?”
Ben tells him.10 Both the confession and the gun are admissible.11 (C) The
FBI arrests John for transporting guns. Without warning (in regard to
topic) they start questioning him about a murder. John makes an inculpatory
statement.12 The statement is admissible.13
In all three of these cases, and numerous others that could be cited, the
suspect has been made the “deluded instrument of his own conviction,”
and the Court is not at all unhappy about it. In Carl’s case, he was
actually deluded twice. He was asked by the police officer if they could
meet to discuss a burglary. By “mutual agreement,” they agreed to meet
at the police station.14 Thus, Carl was not in custody. Consequently, he
received no Miranda warnings. So, despite the tricks and lies, the confession
was admitted.15
The Watts language suggests that we really do not want the police
behaving this way. We know that the Court does not believe that, and
much of society probably does not believe it either. Society, like the

6. Watts, 338 U.S. at 54 (quoting 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch.
46, § 34, at 595 (8th ed. 1824)).
7. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 434 (1958), overruled by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 505, 510
(1958), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493 (1977).
9. Id. at 495.
10. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 652 (1984).
11. Id. at 651.
12. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 567 (1987).
13. Id. at 577.
14. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493.
15. Id. at 495. In fairness, the Court did emphasize that the false statements about
fingerprints were not at issue in the case, only the question of whether Mathiason was in
custody. Id. at 495–96. Thus, in theory, his conviction could have been reversed at a
later time because of the false fingerprints statement. The Court, however, has never so
much as hinted that false inculpatory statements by the police will render a confession
inadmissible. Indeed, their use has become a staple of modern police practice.
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Court, probably believes that if the suspect is given his warnings,16 and
he confesses anyway, society wins and nobody loses. Whether we
should believe that may well depend on how we resolve the “wisdom vs.
intelligence” issue, which will be discussed later.17 But suffice it to say,
it is highly unlikely that we will see “the deluded instrument of his own
conviction” trotted out any time soon.
II. ESCOBEDO V. ILLINOIS
In view of the conclusions from Part I, it is obvious that neither the
Court nor society would accept a strong reading of Escobedo v. Illinois.18
While some might agree that other evidence is better than a confession,
no member of the Court seems prepared to junk confessions entirely.
On the other hand, most jurisdictions, for good reason, will not allow a
conviction to rest on an uncorroborated confession.19 By way of illustration,
consider the recent case of John Karr, who confessed to the murder of
JonBenet Ramsey.20 With no evidence to support the confession, the
Colorado officials chose to not prosecute, as indeed they were required
to do by law.21
Of course, most confession cases that are actually prosecuted involve
no such problem. Sometimes there is extrinsic evidence available, such
as real evidence of the suspect’s fingerprints at the scene of the crime.
Other times the suspect’s confession will provide the corroborating
detail; for example, finding the victim’s body where the suspect says he
left it. Of course, if the confession itself was involuntary, ordinarily the
body would also be inadmissible.22 But if the confession was validly
obtained, so is the corroborating evidence.
Suffice it to say, Escobedo’s strongest anti-confession rhetoric will not
even cause a modern court to pause and think about it.
16. This, of course, did not happen in Mathiason.
17. See infra Part III.
18. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
19. See United States v. Reynolds, 367 F.3d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 2004); United
States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1969); Arena v. United States, 226
F.2d 227, 234 (9th Cir.1955); Hunt v. State, 304 S.E.2d 576, 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983);
State v. Whittington, 450 So. 2d. 47, 48 (La. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Lyle, 182 S.W.2d
530, 532 (Mo. 1944); Smith v. State, 361 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962).
20. Rick Lyman & Ralph Blumenthal, Arrest in Ramsey Case Presents More
Questions Than Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at A1.
21. See Martin v. People, 499 P.2d 606, 608 (Colo. 1972).
22. Unless the police can establish that they would have inevitably discovered it.
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984). Or unless the confession was merely
conclusively presumed to be involuntary under Miranda, as opposed to actually
involuntary. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) (holding that
confessions obtained in violation of Miranda will not exclude real evidence established
by virtue of that confession).
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III. COLORADO V. SPRING AND MORAN V. BURBINE
The statement in Colorado v. Spring, “We have held that a valid
waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information
‘useful’ in making his decision or all information that ‘might . . . affec[t]
his decision to confess,’”23 is an obvious truism. Were it otherwise,
defense lawyers could have a field day. Imagine a defense lawyer arguing:
“You told my client 27 relevant pieces of information. But there was a
28th piece that you missed. If only my client knew that, he might not
have confessed.” Obviously, the Court was correct in not going down that
road—unless it wanted to outlaw all confessions of suspects with good
lawyers.
On the other hand, the fact that all information need not be given
merely begs the question as to what information does need to be given.
The fact that all useful information need not be given does not mean that
no useful information need be given. The question in Spring should
have been whether the police should have told the suspect that he was
going to be questioned about a murder, even though he was arrested on a
weapons charge.
Undoubtedly, Spring was blindsided by the question, and, if you will,
was “made the deluded instrument of his own conviction.” Whether this
is good or bad largely depends on the other question raised by Spring
and Moran v. Burbine—namely whether wisdom matters and whether it
is something different from a “knowing and intelligent” waiver. 24
If we are only concerned about coercion, there is a good deal to support
the Court’s dichotomy. Only if you believe that you are compelled to
speak and the law enforcement officers reinforce, rather than disabuse
you of, that notion, are Fifth Amendment concerns implicated. If, however,
we care about the adversary process, different concerns become relevant.25
IV. MCNEIL V. WISCONSIN
Undoubtedly, a truly uncoerced truthful confession is an unmitigated
good. Obviously, a false confession such as John Karr’s does more harm
than good in that it: (1) raises false hopes; and (2) diverts the police and

23.
added).
24.
25.

Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis
Id. at 577; Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422–24 (1986).
See infra Part VI.
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the District Attorney from performing more useful work than trying to
confirm or disprove the false confession. Similarly, a false uncoerced
statement by one who has been convinced by a skillful police officer that
he really did it is likely to result in a wrongful conviction, which harms
all society, except the real culprit, or at the very least, will delay the
police in their search of the real criminal, perhaps making him harder to
apprehend.
It is also questionable whether confessions obtained in accordance
with Miranda are unmitigated goods. They may be called “uncoerced,”
but few human beings outside of the legal profession would attach that
accolade to them. For example, in Miller v. Fenton,26 a very skillful
interrogator, fully compliant with Miranda, verbally dominated a
suspect to the point that after confessing, the suspect collapsed in a
catatonic state.27
Maybe such a confession is not coerced within the meaning of
Miranda and the voluntary confessions cases, but it can hardly be called
an unmitigated good. At best, it may be something that we have to tolerate
in pursuit of the greater good of obtaining more convictions—although
even that is questionable—but it is, at best, the lesser of evils.
V. THE SUPREME COURT AT ITS WORST:
DAVIS V. UNITED STATES
Davis v. United States was a relatively simple case for which certiorari
should have been denied.28 Instead, the Court granted certiorari and
decided a question not before it, in the process gratuitously retarding the
law of confessions. The facts were simple enough. Davis, a sailor, won
a thirty dollar bet at the pool hall from another sailor, Keith Shackleton,
who refused to pay. Shortly thereafter, Shackleton was found beaten to
death. The apparent murder weapon, found at Shackleton’s side, was a
bloody pool cue, owned by Davis. After having told two others that he
had killed Shackleton, Davis was arrested.29
Upon arrest, Davis was given and waived his Miranda rights, whereupon
questioning began. About an hour into the questioning, Davis said:
“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”30 The officers then stopped the interview
and asked Davis whether he wanted a lawyer. Davis replied: “No, I’m
not asking for a lawyer. No, I don’t want a lawyer.” After clearing that
matter up, interrogation continued for another hour when Davis said: “I
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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796 F.2d 598, 625 (3d Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting).
Miller, 796 F.2d 598 app. at 628–43.
512 U.S. 452 (1994).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455.
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think I want a lawyer before saying anything else.”31 At that point, all
interrogation ceased.
Not surprisingly, the lower court found that the military police acted
properly.32 Somewhat more surprisingly, Davis’s lawyers convinced the
Supreme Court that this was a certiorari-worthy case, a move that surely
proved Pyrrhic for defense lawyers and defendants everywhere. The
Court, unsurprisingly and unanimously, concluded that none of Davis’s
rights were violated, and affirmed the conviction.33 Much more surprisingly,
five of the Justices, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, concluded that
the police had actually done more than they needed to do, and that it
would have been perfectly acceptable if they had simply ignored Davis’s
ambiguous request and continued the interrogation.34
This was a truly extraordinary opinion. It is difficult to find any other
case in which the Court agreed to hear the case at the behest of the
defendant, listened to the arguments, and held that the police did more
for the defendant than they had to do. And, there is good reason why such
an opinion is so rare. No one is there to argue the benefits and detriments of
the rule being promulgated. Davis’s lawyer was not going to argue the
downside of the police not stopping to ask for clarification. His argument
was that the police should not ask; they should just assume that “maybe”
means “yes.” The crucible of litigation frequently picks up pitfalls that
would cause a court to rethink what it is doing.
In this case, for example, the Court seemed concerned that Miranda
and its progeny had already produced too much prophylaxis.35 Consequently,
it was unwilling to allow anything short of a clear, certain assertion for
the right to counsel to apply. But, as Justice Souter’s concurrence mentioned,
but merely adumbrated, there is a danger of the Court’s rule violating the
core of the Fifth Amendment.36 To illustrate, imagine the following
hypothetical dialogue in Davis, as now apparently permitted by the
Supreme Court:

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 462
Id. at 459.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 472 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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DAVIS: Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.
MILITARY POLICE (M.P.): So why did you kill Keith Shackleton?
DAVIS: I’m thinking that maybe I should talk to a lawyer before I
answer any more questions.
M.P. (Firmly): I said, why did you kill Keith Shackleton?!
DAVIS: Shouldn’t I talk to my lawyer first?
M.P. (Loud and firm): LOOK DAVIS. I SAID WHY DID YOU KILL
KEITH SHACKLETON?
AND THIS TIME I WANT SOME
STRAIGHT ANSWERS. DO YOU READ ME SAILOR?!
DAVIS (Convinced his request will go unheeded): Because the son
of a bitch welshed on his thirty dollar bet with me.
One would hope that if this had been the fact pattern, at least one
Justice in the five Justice majority would have joined the concurring Justices
in concluding that running roughshod over an ambiguous request is itself
coercive, very much like Danny Escobedo’s ignored request in Escobedo
v. Illinois.37 Perhaps the Court could still reach that result on grounds
that the hypothesized confession was in fact coerced, as opposed to
merely conclusively, presumptively coerced. Precipitously reaching out to
decide a question not presented by the record, however, certainly set
confession jurisprudence back significantly.
VI. GAUGING THE SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM
If one believes that a legally uncoerced confession is “an unmitigated
good,” the Court’s current jurisprudence probably only requires minor
tweaking. On the other hand, if one’s belief is that “a prisoner should
not be made the deluded instrument of his own conviction,” the Court’s
jurisprudence probably needs some serious root and branch retooling.
The current jurisprudence does not likely allow too many legally coerced
confessions through, except perhaps those cases analogous to the Davis
hypothetical38 or the Quarles case (Officer points gun at suspect, does
not give Miranda warning, and says “Where’s the gun”?).39 Theoretically,
in those cases, it is possible that the Court could hold the confession to

37.
38.
39.
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be factually involuntary, though that is surely not a secure backup.40
Nevertheless, for the most part the Court’s jurisprudence does not permit
the admission of confessions that are the equivalent of legally compelled
confessions.
On the other hand, any student of criminal procedure can tick off a
large number of cases where the accused has been made “the deluded
instrument of his own conviction.” To the extent that this is bothersome,
it is mostly out of a sense that this is not the way the adversary process is
supposed to work. That is, some of us believe that once a defendant is
arrested, the police should attempt to convict him by evidence other than
that tricked or cajoled from his own mouth.
Ultimately, the latter view should be supported. Coerced confessions
are a problem, but they are not the only problem. Miranda, to a greater
or lesser extent, takes care of the problem of coercion. It does not,
however, even purport to deal with compromising the adversary process.
But it should.
VII. FIXING THE PROBLEM
To fix the problem, Miranda should be reconceptualized as a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel case. If it were, and one or two other cases
were appropriately tweaked, Miranda could more adequately protect the
adversary process. It is worth noting that once the Sixth Amendment
takes effect, the police may not deliberately elicit a confession. It does
not matter whether the defendant is in custody or even subject to
interrogation. So long as the police deliberately elicit a confession—
even through false friends who are cooperating with the police—the
confession is inadmissible.41
There can be no question that once adversarial positions harden,
neither side should be able to surreptitiously seek information from the
other side. Consider the following hypothetical: Alan, who is on trial for
first degree murder, persuades his friend Bob to listen in on a prosecutorial
strategy session. Bob, a friend of the attorney general, Charles, arranges
to drop by for lunch when he knows that Charles and his colleague,
Donna, will be discussing the case. Bob persuades Charles and Donna
to let him join them for lunch while they discuss the case. During the
40. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 605 (3d Cir. 1986).
41. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 164–66 (1985); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 202–03 (1964).
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discussion, Charles and Donna conclude that they should try very hard to
strike a deal for murder in the second degree, but, if Alan adamantly
insists on a trial, to accept manslaughter. Bob reports this conversation
to Alan, who in turn tells his own lawyer, Elana, to accept nothing greater
than manslaughter during negotiations. Subsequently Charles yields and
Alan pleads guilty to manslaughter.
Surely there can be no question that Bob’s behavior is grossly unethical
and probably criminal. In a fair trial, what is sauce for the goose should
be sauce for the gander. If Alan cannot surreptitiously get information
from Charles, Charles should not be able to get surreptitious information
from Alan.42
The issue is: When do the parties become adversarial? Conventional
wisdom suggests that it is at the onset of official judicial proceedings.
But this has not always been the rule. In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court
held that when the proceedings move from “investigatory to accusatory,”
the right to counsel and the adversary process begins.43 Of course, the
Court retreated from this in Miranda; but, if the Court was right the first
time, one can always hope for a return to wisdom.
The Court was right in Escobedo. First, the police may not arrest without
probable cause. If they do, a voluntary confession in full accord with
Miranda may be inadmissible.44 Second, probable cause is precisely the
standard that a grand jury must satisfy in order to justify an indictment
that would trigger the right to counsel.45 Quite frankly, when a police
officer grabs a suspect by the scruff of the neck, handcuffs him, and
hauls him down to the police station, it is nonsense to pretend that this is
nonadversarial. Consequently, Miranda should be reconceptualized as a
right to counsel case.
Let us now look at what might flow from this characterization. At
some level, the defendant may be no better off. Sixth Amendment cases
are offense-specific. Thus, if Miranda was only a Sixth Amendment right,
the police could question an arrested subject, who had already invoked
his Miranda rights, about any crime for which he was not arrested.
Consequently, in addition to being a Sixth Amendment case, the Miranda
prophylactic rules would have to remain to protect against genuinely
coerced confessions under the Fifth Amendment.
But in some particulars, the Court has refused to treat Sixth Amendment
42. Cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557–58 (1977) (reversing the Fourth
Circuit’s per se rule forbidding an undercover agent from meeting with a defendant’s
counsel, so long as the agent did not receive privileged information that otherwise would
have implicated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
43. 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
44. See, e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 694 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
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rights as any different from Fifth Amendment rights. In Patterson v.
Illinois, for example, the Court held that Miranda warnings were sufficient
protection to an indicted murder suspect.46 Two factors influenced the
Court. First, counsel did an incredibly poor job of explaining what
additional warnings should be given and how they would help.47 Second,
the Court emphasized the minimal role that counsel could play during
interrogation. In essence, the Court did precisely the opposite of what is
being advocated here. The Court reduced counsel’s role to preventing
coerced confessions rather than increasing counsel’s role under Miranda
to what the Sixth Amendment should embody.
Specifically, the following words should be added to the Miranda
warnings after being informed of the right to counsel (including appointed
counsel): “In deciding whether to accept counsel, you should understand
that policemen like me frequently try to get people they arrest to confess.
You should know that there is a possibility that I, or one of my colleagues,
will do that. A lawyer can help protect you from that.”
Of course, the Court as a whole probably thinks that suspects have too
much rather than too little protection.48 Consequently, it is highly unlikely
that this proposal will be implemented any time soon. Nevertheless, such a
change would bring us closer to the adversary model we are supposed to
live by.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The proposal advocated in this Article will not eliminate all confessions.
It will not even eliminate all confessions obtained by making the suspect
“the deluded instrument of his own conviction.” For example, the result
in Colorado v. Spring is not likely to change.49 The right to counsel is
offense specific, so that right would give him no extra protection when
questioned about a separate crime. Thus, Spring, unless he asked for
counsel as a result of the beefed up Miranda warnings, would still be
subject to questions about murder even though he was arrested for gun
46. 487 U.S. 285, 296–98 (1988).
47. Id. at 295 n.7.
48. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994); supra Part V.
Although Justice O’Connor, who wrote the opinion, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
joined it, are no longer on the Court, there is no reason to believe that Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito will have significantly different views on the question—though
one can always hope.
49. See supra Part III.
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running. And, of course, if the suspect were not yet in custody, obviously
the adversary process would not have begun. Thus cases like Mathiason50
will remain the law and perhaps even be expanded by more and more
police stratagems not counted as custodial arrests.51
Nevertheless, this proposal does come closer to recognizing the nature
of the adversary system. It also strikes a decent balance between not
making a suspect “the deluded instrument of his own conviction” and
treating “uncoerced confessions as an unmitigated good.” It will allow
some, though assuredly not all, uncoerced confessions to be admitted.
At the same time, it will sometimes, but not always, prevent a suspect
from becoming “the deluded instrument of his own confession.” It is too
bad that the current Court will not take it seriously.

50. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
51. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664–65 (2004) (holding that
suspect was not in custody when the police had suspect’s parents bring him in for
questioning, denied the parents the opportunity to participate in the meeting, and held the
suspect until he confessed, whereupon the police released him).
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